Personality Traits and the Marriage Market * Which and how many attributes are relevant for the sorting of agents in a matching market? This paper addresses these questions by constructing indices of mutual attractiveness that aggregate information about agents' attributes. The first k indices for agents on each side of the market provide the best approximation of the matching surplus by a k-dimensional model. The methodology is applied on a unique Dutch household survey containing information about education, height, BMI, health, attitude towards risk and personality traits of spouses. Three important empirical conclusions are drawn. First, sorting in the marriage market is not unidimensional: individuals face important trade-offs between the attributes of their spouses which are not amenable to a single-dimensional index. Second, although education explains a quarter of a couple's observable surplus, personality traits explain another 20%. Third, different personality traits matter differently for men and for women.
Introduction
Marriage plays an important role in the distribution of welfare across individuals and in the intergenerational transmission of economic opportunities. In-depth understanding of marriage patterns is therefore of crucial importance for the study of a wide range of economic issues and in particular income inequality.
A growing body of the economic literature studies both empirically and theoretically the determinants of marriage as a competitive matching market. This literature draws insights from the seminal model of the marriage market developed by Becker (1973) . At the heart of this theory lies a two-sided assignment model with transferable utilities where agents on both sides of the market (men and women) are characterized by a set of attributes which is only partly observed by the econometrician. Each agent aims at matching with a member of the opposite sex so as to maximize her own payo¤s. This model is particularly interesting (Fox, 2010 , Terviö, 2008 , Gabaix and Landier, 2008 . So far, however, this literature has faced two important limitations that impede answers to the central question raised above.
The …rst limitation is related to the quantitative methods available to identify and estimate features of the surplus function. Up until recently 1 , these tools were only designed to study matching markets where sorting is unidimensional, i.e. occurs on a single index. Due 1 Recently, two papers have studied markets were sorting occurs on more than one dimension. In the present paper, we contribute to the literature on three accounts. First, on the modeling front, we extent the Choo and Siow matching model to account for continuous types. In turns, this allows us to extend Salanié's (2010, 2012) inference of the Choo and Siow model to the continuous case. This extension allows us to consider at the same time attributes that are discrete and attributes that are continuous.
Second, on the data analysis front, we introduce a new technique to determine the most relevant dimensions on which sorting occurs in a matching market. We thus derive "indices of mutual attractiveness" by performing a Singular Value Decomposition of the estimated quadratic matching surplus. We call this new technique Saliency Analysis. The …rst k indices (for males and females) provide the best approximation of the matching surplus by a model where attributes are vectors of only k dimension. As a consequence, we can perform inference on the number of dimensions that are required in order to explain the sorting on the observed market by testing how many singular values di¤er from zero.
Third, on the empirical front, we make use of a unique dataset that allows us to observe a wide range of attributes for both spouses. The set of attributes we observe in the data includes socio-economic variables (education, age), anthropometric measures such as height and BMI, a measure of self assessed health, but also psychometric attributes such 2 Bruze (2011) shows that sorting on education occurs even in segments (movie stars) where it does not relate to …nancial traits of spouses. He concludes that men and women have strong preferences for non…nancial attributes of their spouse correlated with education (potentially personality traits).
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as risk aversion and the "Big Five" personality traits, well-known in the Psychology literature: conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, emotional stability and autonomy.
This paper is, to the extent of our knowledge, the …rst attempt to evaluate the importance of personality traits in the sorting of men and women in the marriage market.
Saliency Analysis requires to estimate the surplus function, which will be chosen quadratic with respect to the male and female attributes. These attributes are assumed continuously distributed in the population. In the discrete case, one could apply a technique developed by Salanié (2010, 2012) other things that conscientious men have preferences for conscientious and agreeable women whereas extravert women have preferences for extravert and less agreeable men.
The remaining structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents an important extension of the model of Choo and Siow to the case with continuously distributed observables. Section 3 deals with parametric estimation of the surplus function in this setting.
Section 4 presents a methodology to derive indices of mutual attractiveness that determine the principal dimensions on which sorting occurs. The problem of infering the number of dimensions on which sorting occurs is dealt with in section 5. Section 6 presents the data used for our empirical estimation and Section 7 discusses the results. Section 8 concludes. women. Men and women are assumed to be in equal number; let P and Q be the respective probability distribution of their attributes. P and Q are assumed to have densities with respect to the Lebesgue measure denoted respectively f and g. Without loss of generality, it is assumed throughout that P and Q are centered distributions, that is
The Continuous Choo and Siow model
A matching is the probability density (x; y) of drawing a couple with characteristics (x; y) from the population. Quite obviously, this imposes that the marginals of be P and Q, which we write 2 M (P; Q), where
Let (x; y) be the joint surplus generated when a man x and a woman y match, to be shared endogenously between them. It is assumed that the utility of unmatched individuals 3 For the purposes of the subsequent analysis, we present a variant of the Choo and Siow model with no singles. However, all of our results apply to the model with singles.
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ARNAUD DUPUY AND ALFRED GALICHON is 1 for all x and y, so that every market participant is matched. In this setting, Shapley and Shubik (1972) have shown that the optimal matching maximizes the total surplus
Optimality condition (2.1) leads to very strong restrictions 4 on (X; Y ), which are rarely met in practice. We need to incorporate some amount of unobserved heterogeneity in the model.
Adding heterogeneities.
Bringing the model to the data requires the additional step of acknowledging that sorting might also occur on attributes that are unobserved to the econometrician. In the case where men and women attributes are discrete, Choo and Siow 
However, in many applied settings, the attributes are continuous random vectors. In the present paper, we shall present an application where x and y measure height, BMI and various personality traits, which have a continuous multivariate distribution, and hence we need to model the random processes for " m (x) and w (y).
A natural choice is the continuous logit setting. 4 A basic result in the theory of optimal transportation (Brenier's theorem) implies that in this case, the optimal matching is characterized by AY = rV (X) where V is some convex function. Hence as soon as A is invertible, the matching is pure, in the sense that no two men of the same type may marry women of di¤erent types. This is obviously never observed in the data. Assume that the utility surplus of a man m of observed attributes x (that is, such that
who marries a woman of observed attributes y can be written as
where the sympathy shock " m (:) is a stochastic process on Y 0 modelled as an extreme value stochastic process Similarly, and with the same interpretation, the utility of a woman w of attributes y w = y who marries a man of attributes x is (x; y) + w (x) ;
where (x l ; w l ) is the enumeration of a Poisson point process on X R of intensity dx e d .
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We now give the main result of this section, which extends Galichon and Salanié (2010) to the continuous case.
Theorem 1. The following holds:
(i) Under the assumptions stated above, the optimal matching maximizes the social gain
, where E is given by
! (x; y) dxdy:
(ii) In equilibrium, for any x 2 X ; y 2 Y
where the potentials a (x) and b (y) are determined such that 2 M (P; Q). They exist and are uniquely determined up to a constant.
(iii) A man m of attributes x who marries a woman of attributes y obtains utility
Similarly, a woman w of attributes y who marries a man of attributes x obtains utility
where
As in Galichon and Salanié (2010) , and independently, Decker et al. (2012) , part (i) of this result expresses the fact that the optimal matching re ‡ects a trade-o¤ between sorting on the observed characteristics, which tends to maximize the term R (x; y) (x; y) dxdy, and sorting on the unobserved characteristics, which tends to maximize the entropic term E( ), i.e. the relative entropy of (x; y) with respect to f (x) g (y), which is the "random PERSONALITY TRAITS AND THE MARRIAGE MARKET 9 matching", or independent coupling of P and Q. The second term will therefore "pull" the solution towards the random matching; the parameter , which measures the intensity of the unobserved heterogeneity, measures the intensity of this trade-o¤. The smaller , the less unobserved heterogenity in the model, and the closer the solution will be to the solution without heterogeneity. On the contrary, the higher , the larger the probabilistic independence between the characteristics of men and women.
Part (ii) of the result is an expression of the …rst order optimality conditions. The problem is an in…nite dimensional linear programming problem; a (x) and b (y) are the Lagrange multipliers corresponding to the constraints
respectively. Taking the logarithm of Equation (2.5) yields
which will be the basis of our estimation strategy.
Along with the constraint 2 M (P; Q), equation ( From an identi…cation perspective, equation (2.10) implies that (x; y) allows to identify (x; y) = up to a separatively additive function: as we do not observe singles and assume their reservation utilities to be minus in…nity, (x; y) = is observationally indistinguishable from (x; y) = + (x) + (y).
Part (iii) of the result explains how the surplus is shared at equilibrium. Unsurprisingly, just as in Choo and Siow (2006) and Galichon and Salanié (2010; 2012) , individuals do not transfer their sympathy shock at equilibrium, which is expressed by formulas (2.6) and (2.8). Formulas (2.7) and (2.9) provide the formulas for the systematic part of the surplus.
As previously noted, a (x) and b (y) are the Lagrange multipliers of the scarcity constraint of men's observable attributes x and women's attributes y. Hence a higher a (x) shall mean a higher relative scarcity for x, and hence a greater prospect for surplus extraction.
Parametric estimation
In this section we shall deal with parametric estimation of the surplus function . The technique we apply here was introduced by Galichon and Salanié (2010); we discuss here its extension to the continuous case, which does not raise particular conceptual challenges.
In the remainder of the paper, we shall assume a quadratic parametrization of : for A a
where we term the matrix A the a¢ nity matrix. We need to impose some normalization on A, and hence we shall …x kAk = 1, where k:k is the Froebenius norm:
One has
so A ij measures the intensity of the complementarity/substitutability between attribute x i of the man x and attribute y j of the woman. If A ij > 0, x i and y j are complementary, and (all things else being equal) high x i tend to match with high y j . For instance, the education level of one of the partners may be complementary with the risk aversion of the other partner. On the contrary, if A ij < 0, then x i and y j are substitutable.
Note that attributes should not be interpreted as a positive quality (where a greater value of x i , the i-th dimension of x, would be more socially desirable than a smaller value of x i ) as is sometimes done in the literature. The model above is indeed observationally indistinguishable from the same model but where x is replaced by x and y by y. Instead,
x and y account for the strength of mutual attractiveness on various dimensions.
In order to estimate A, introduce the cross-covariance matrix
PERSONALITY TRAITS AND THE MARRIAGE MARKET 11 which is computed at the optimal solution of (2.2) and note that the optimal matching maximizes the social gain
By the envelope theorem
In a setting with discrete observables, Galichon and Salanié (2012) showed that B = A= is identi…ed as a solution to the following optimization program
whose …rst-order conditions are precisely (3.2). In the present setting with continuous observables, things work in an exactly similar fashion. Using the normalization kAk = 1, A and can then be found by
Note that if needed, this way of identifying A extends by continuity to the case = 0. Let us denote A XY the (unique) solution to this problem, and call it a¢ nity matrix. Intuitively,
indicates the marginal change in a couple's surplus when increasing the man's i th attribute and woman's j th attribute by 1 unit. This parameter A XY is "dual" to XY in the sense that Equation (3.2) is invertible, but unlike XY , it has a structural interpretation:
it is the vector of weights of interactions of the various attributes. we argue that this technique is not well suited for studying assortative matching, and that the resulting procedure is inconsistent. Instead we propose in Section 4 a method we call "Saliency Analysis" in order to correctly answer these two questions. This method is essentially based on the singular value decomposition of the a¢ nity matrix A XY (instead of XY as in Canonical Correlation). Testing the rank of the a¢ nity matrix is equivalent to testing the number of (potentially multiple) singular values di¤erent from 0. Performing this decomposition allows one to construct "indices of mutual attractiveness" that each explain a separate share of the surplus.
Saliency Analysis
In this section we set out to determine what is the rank of the a¢ nity matrix A XY , and what are the principal dimensions in which it operates. For this we introduce and describe a novel technique we call Saliency Analysis, which is close to Canonical Correlation in spirit but does not su¤er the pitfalls of the latter. Instead of performing a singular value decomposition of the (renormalized) cross-covariance matrix XY , we shall perform a singular value decomposition of the renormalized a¢ nity matrix A XY .
Recall that we have de…ned the cross-covariance matrix XY = E [XY 0 ], and introduce
We shall in fact work with the rescaled attributes In particular, this implies that testing for multidimensional sorting versus unidimensional sorting is equivalent to testing whether at least two singular values i are signi…cantly larger than 0.
Infering the number of sorting dimensions
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Assume that a …nite sample of size n is observed. The vector of mutual attraction weights estimated on the sample is denoted^ 6 , while the vector of mutual attraction weights in the population is denoted . SimilarlyÂ is the estimator of A. Let^ X ,^ Y and^ XY be the sample estimators of X , Y and XY , respectively. For a given quantity M , we shall denote M the di¤erence betweenM , the estimator of M and M , that is
In the sequel, we shall represent linear operators acting on matrices as tensors, for which we shall use the bold notation to distinguish them from matrices, and we shall treat matrices as vectors, an operation which is called vectorization in matrix algebra. If T is a tensor T ij kl , then T M will denote the matrix N such that
We recall the de…nition of the Kronecker product: for two matrices A and B, A B is the tensor T such that
De…ne two important tensors associated to the large sample properties of the model. The
Fisher Information matrix is de…ned by
and the variance-covariance matrix of the quadratic moments of (X; Y ) is de…ned as
so that the following Theorem holds:
Theorem 2. The following convergence holds in distribution for n ! +1:
whose singular value decomposition is^
and using the fact that
one has
and we get as a consequence:
As n tends to in…nity,
We would like to use this asymptotic result to test the rank of the a¢ nity matrix . This where the blocks are dimensioned so thatÛ 0 11 andV 11 are two p p square matrices. De…nê
so that we get, as a consequence of Kleibergen and Paap, Theorem 1:
. As a result, the test-statistic
converges under the null hypothesis H0:
The data
In this paper, we use data from the DNB Household Survey (DHS) This data has three main features that are particularly attractive for our purpose. First, within each household, all persons aged 16 or over were interviewed 8 . This implies that the data contains detailed information not only about the head of the household but about 7 For a thorough description of the set up and quality of this data we refer the reader to Nyhus (1996) 8 The section General Information on the Household includes all members of the household (also those under 16 years of age).
all individuals in the household. In particular, the data identi…es "spouses" and "perma- ing from primary to university education. We coded responses as follows:
(1) Lower education 11 , The respondents were also asked about their height and weight. From the responses to these questions we calculated the Body Mass Index of each respondent as the weight in Kg divided by the square of the height measured in meters. The respondents were also asked to report their general health. The phrasing of the question was: "How do your rate your general health condition on a scale from 1, excellent, to 5, poor?" 14 . We de…ned our measure of health by subtracting the answer to this question to 6.
The DHS panel contains three lists of items that would allow one to assess a respondent's personality traits. the respective scales. In other words, "Emotional stability" is constructed using items:
"Oriented toward reality"/"dreamer", "Happy with myself"/"doubtful", 15 Using the 1996 wave that contains both the FFPI module and the 16PA module, Nyhus and Webley (2001) checked the correlation between the 5 factors identi…ed by the 16PA scale and the (big) …ve factors identi…ed by the FFPI. The correlation is generally high though not perfect. This suggests that both sets of factors assess slightly di¤erent aspects of the latent factors. We followed Nyhus and Webley and use a slightly less general wording for the various dimensions identi…ed from the 16PA scale. 16 See the Appendix for the list of items.
"need to be supported"/"independent", "well-balanced"/"quick-tempered", "slow-thinker"/"quick thinker" and, "easily worried"/"not easily worried". "Agreeableness," or ‡exibility, is constructed using items:
"creature of habit"/"open to changes", "slow thinker"/"quick thinker", "quiet, calm"/"vivid and, vivacious". "Autonomy," or tough-mindedness, is constructed based on:
"direct, straightforward"/"diplomatic, "quiet, calm"/"vivid, vivacious" and, "shy"/"dominant".
"Extraversion" is based on:
"oriented towards things"/"towards people", " ‡exible"/"stubborn" and, "trusting, credulous"/"suspicious".
"Conscientiousness" is constructed using:
"little self-control"/"disciplined", "carefree"/"meticulous" and,
"not easily hurt"/"easily hurt, sensitive" 17 . 17 As a robustness check, we constructed the full scale using the 1993, 1994, 1995 and 1996 waves. We The data also contains information about attitude toward risk 18 . The attitude toward risk can be assessed in the data using a list of 6 items of the type "I am prepared to take the risk to lose money, when there is also a chance to gain money...... from a scale from 1, totally disagree, to 7, totally agree". As for the 16PA items, there is a great stability of answers by the same person over time (see Nyhus and Webley, 2001 ). We therefore simply collapse the data by individual using the person's median answer to each item. We then construct an index of risk aversion by adding the three items formulated positively (aversion towards risk) and subtracting the three items formulated negatively. The Cronbach's alpha is 0.86 which indicates the great reliability of this scale.
6.2. Identi…cation of "couples". Our de…nition of a couple is a man and woman living in the same household and reporting being either head of the household, spouse of the head or a permanent partner (not married) of the head. To construct our data set of couples, we …rst pool all the waves selected (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) . We then keep only those respondents that report being head of the household, spouse of the head or a permanent (not married)
partner of the head. This sample contains roughly 13,000 men and women and identi…es about 7,700 unique households. We then create two data sets, one containing women and one containing men. Each data set identi…es about 6,500 di¤erent men and women. We create our working dataset of couples by merging the men dataset to the women dataset using the household identi…er. We identify 5,445 unique couples while roughly 1,250 men and 1,250 women remain unmatched. points in his wife's BMI). In our sample, we …nd that higher educated men (interpreting education as permanent income) are matched with women of lower BMI, i.e. a man with one additional level of education is matched with a woman whose BMI is 0.5 units lower.
Empirical results
We apply the Saliency Analysis outlined in the previous section on our sample of couples.
The procedure requires …rst to estimate the a¢ nity matrix. This is done by applying the technique presented in section 3. The estimation results are reported in Table 3 . It is important to note that the estimates reported in the table are obtained using standardized variables rather than the original ones. The main advantage of using standardized variables is that the magnitude of the coe¢ cients is directly comparable across variables, allowing a direct interpretation in terms of comparative statics.
The estimates of the a¢ nity matrix reveal four important and remarkable features:
(1) First, education is the single most important factor in the marriage market. The Using the estimated a¢ nity matrix, we then proceed to the Saliency Analysis as introduced in the previous section. This enables us to i) test whether sorting is unidimensional,
i.e. occurs on a single-index and ii) construct pairs of indices of mutual attractiveness for men and women.
We …rst test the dimensionality of the sorting in the marriage market. For p = 1, that is testing against the null hypothesis that sorting occurs on a single index, we …nd that nT 0 1^ 1 1T 1 = 508:4 which is signi…cant at the 1% level. This implies that sorting in the marriage market does not occur on a single index as has been assumed in the previous literature. In fact, our test-statistic never becomes insigni…cant. Even for p = 9 we have nT 0 9^ 1 9T 9 = 7:4 which is still signi…cant at the 1% level. This suggests that the a¢ nity matrix has full rank and that sorting occurs on at least 10 observed indices. Our results therefore clearly highlight that sorting in the marriage market is multidimensional and individuals face important trade-o¤s between the attributes of their spouses.
Each pair of indices derived from Saliency Analysis explains a mutually exclusive part of the total observable surplus of couples. The share explained by each of our 10 indices is reported in Table 4 . The table shows that the share of the …rst 8 pairs of indices is sign…cantly di¤erent from 0 at the 1% level.
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As for the Principal Component Analysis, the labeling of each dimension is subjective and becomes increasingly di¢ cult to interpret as one considers more dimensions. Table   5 
where x m and y w denote respectively the vectors of attributes of man m and woman w.
Write (A.3) as a saddlepoint problem
or in other words
The results derived thus far do not depend on the particular choice of stochastic processes " m (y) and w (x). Now, it remains to compute E, and thus G x and H y with the distributional assumptions made on these stochastic processes. Introduce Note that this is exactly the probability that the Poisson point process (y k ; " m k ) has no point in (y; ") : U (x; y) + 2 " > c , which is equal to
Now, in order to get an expression for E ( ) it remains to compute
By F.O.C.,
=2 dy which implies that the value of the problem is in…nite unless R (x; y) dy = f (x), in which case it is
A symmetric expression is obtained for the other side of the market, and …nally
(ii) Letting
one has log (x; y) = U (x; y) a (x) =2 and log (x; y) = V (x; y) b (y) =2
and by summation (x; y) = exp (x; y) a (x) b (y) :
and similarly
By (A.2), one sees that if man m of type x marries a woman of type x, he gets surplus
A.2. Proof of Lemma 1.
Proof. Recall that every a¢ nity matrix A XY is characterized by the fact that:
Let P M (resp. Q N ) be the distribution of M X (resp N Y ). We therefore have that:
where the second equality follows by de…nition and the third by using (A.4). A simple calculation shows that
Taking the derivative with respect to A, yields
And, by comparing (A.5) and (A.6), one gets given that M and N are invertible, it follows that
QED.
A.3. Proof of Theorem 2. The proof of the theorem will make use of the following useful facts, which directly follow from the properties of the log-likelihood and the constraints on the marginal distributions.
Lemma 2. Let A 2 M (P; Q) be the optimal matching computed for surplus function A .
Then
Proof of Theorem 2. In the sequel, we let
be the distribution of the empirical sample under observation, and A is the optimal matching computed for surplus function A (we shall drop the subscript A when there is no ambiguity). Recall that the (population) a¢ nity matrix A is characterized by
and its sample estimatorÂ
By the Delta method, we get TRAITS AND THE MARRIAGE MARKET   31 where F is the Hessian of W at A, whose expression is
where 2 M (P; Q) is the optimal matching computed for the surplus function A . Further,
where we have used (A.8), and similarly, E
This proves the asymptotic independence between A and ( X ; Y ). The conclusion follows by noting that the asymptotic variance-covariance matrix of A is F 1 , and that of
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Appendix B. Tables   Table 1. Number of identi…ed couples and number of couples with complete information for various subset of variables.
N Identi…ed couples 5,445
Couples with complete information on:
The above + Health, Height and BMI a 3,214
The above + Personality traits (Big 5) 2,573
The above + measure of risk aversion 2,378
Notes: The selected sample for our analysis is the one from the last row.
a: Excluding health produces exactly the sam e numb er of couples at this stage.
Source: DNB. Own calculation. Appendix C. Questionnaire about personality and attitudes
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Personality traits, the 16PA scale.
Now we would like to know how you would describe your personality. Below we have mentioned a number of personal qualities in pairs. The qualities are not always opposites.
Please indicate for each pair of qualities which number would best describe your personality.
If you think your personality is equally well characterized by the quality on the left as it is by the quality on the right, please choose number 4. If you really don't know, type 0 (zero).
Scale: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 TEG1: oriented towards things oriented towards people.
TEG2 slow thinker quick thinker.
TEG3: easily get worried not easily get worried. TEG14: need to be supported independent, self-reliant.
TEG15: little self-control disciplined.
TEG16: well-balanced, stable irritable, quick-tempered. 19 The following website: http://www.centerdata.nl/en/TopMenu/Databank/DHS_data/Codeboeken/ provides a link to the complete description of the questionnaire.
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Attitude towards risk.
The following statements concern saving and taking risks. Please indicate for each statement to what extent you agree or disagree, on the basis of your personal opinion or experience.
totally disagree totally agree: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 SPAAR1: I think it is more important to have safe investments and guaranteed returns, than to take a risk to have a chance to get the highest possible returns.
SPAAR2: I would never consider investments in shares because I …nd this too risky.
SPAAR3: if I think an investment will be pro…table, I am prepared to borrow money to make this investment.
SPAAR4: I want to be certain that my investments are safe.
SPAAR5: I get more and more convinced that I should take greater …nancial risks to improve my …nancial position.
SPAAR6: I am prepared to take the risk to lose money, when there is also a chance to gain money.
